Is there a particular‐universal distinction? Ramsey famously advocated scepticism about this distinction. In “Some Formal Ontological Relations” E.J. Lowe argues against Ramsey that a particular‐universal distinction can be made out after all if only we allow ourselves the resources to distinguish between the elements of a four‐fold ontology. But in defence of Ramsey I argue that the case remains to be made in favour of either the four‐fold ontology Lowe recommends or the articulation of a particular‐universal distinction within it. I (...) also argue that the case remains to be made against a spatio‐temporal conception of the particular‐universal distinction. (shrink)

G. F. Stout is famous as an early twentieth century proselyte for abstract particulars, or tropes as they are now often called. He advanced his version of trope theory to avoid the excesses of nominalism on the one hand and realism on the other. But his arguments for tropes have been widely misconceived as metaphysical, e.g. by Armstrong. In this paper, I argue that Stout’s fundamental arguments for tropes were ideological and epistemological rather than metaphysical. He moulded his scheme to (...) fit what is actually given to us in perception, arguing that our epistemic practices would break down in an environment where only universals were given to us. (shrink)

The present state of ethical theory and practice is disquieting. Objectivism, in all its varieties, is unconvincing, and subjectivism, hedonic or emotive, is intellectually incredible and socially intolerable. No one is ethically content—except the dogmatist and the sceptic, who act willy nilly with the exponents of “might-cum-persuasion makes right.” Can we find a happier middle region between these inhospitable poles? Perhaps the very limitations of human valuation will provide the ground that ethics requires. Let us begin by considering the conditions (...) which must hold if ethical action is to be possible: 1. Only if the agent can provide a justifying reason for his choice of action can he claim to act ethically. For ethical action is a species of purposive action, and to act purposively entails the ability to give justifying reasons for one's choice of action. . Thus ethical action presupposes putatively grounded ethical judgment. 2. Justifying reasons must be acknowledgeable by all competent judges, i.e. by all persons who are acquainted with all relevant knowledge of the nature and consequences of the alternative courses of action, allow as far as possible for congenital, cultural and idiosyncratic bias, are capable of sane and serious reflection, and are able to make survey of their experience and to draw conclusions from it. For the judgment “the action A is ethically preferable to its alternatives B ” entails “A ought to be done” which in turn entails “every competent judge is capable of acknowledging the ground of the judgment ‘A is ethically preferable to B’ and consequently would be able to set himself to perform A as an ethical act, .” We can assure ourselves of this requirement of acknowledgeability by observing that whenever we resolve, and not merely settle, an ethical disagreement, we have achieved not only a factual, predictive, valuational and attitudinal agreement between the disputants, but a joint acknowledgment of the ground of the ethical judgment. Without this, the agreement could not be said to be ethical, whether the judgment be right or wrong or neither, but merely an agreement to disagree, ethically. Unless ethical disagreement is in principle resolvable, ethical judgment is impossible, for we should be unable to claim that our choice ought to be acted upon. (shrink)

Further arguments are offered in defence of the position that the variant of quantum field theory (QFT) that should be subject to interpretation and foundational analysis is axiomatic quantum field theory. I argue that the successful application of renormalization group (RG) methods within alternative formulations of QFT illuminates the empirical content of QFT, but not the theoretical content. RG methods corroborate the point of view that QFT is a case of the underdetermination of theory by empirical evidence. I also urge (...) caution in extrapolating interpretive conclusions about QFT from the application of RG methods in other contexts (e.g., condensed matter physics). This paper replies to criticisms advanced by David Wallace, but aims to be self-contained. (shrink)

According to philosophical folklore Ramsey maintained three propositions in his famous 1925 paper “Universals”: (i) there is no subject-predicate distinction; (ii) there is no particular-universal distinction; (iii) there is no particular-universal distinction because there is no subject-predicate distinction. The ‘first generation’ of Ramsey commentators dismissed “Universals” because they held that whereas predicates may be negated, names may not and so there is a subject-predicate distinction after all. The ‘second generation’ of commentators dismissed “Universals because they held that the absence of (...) a merely linguistic distinction between subject and predicate does not provide any kind of reason for doubting that a truly ontological (i.e. non-linguistic) distinction obtains between particulars and universals. But both first and second-generation criticisms miss their marks because Ramsey did not maintain the three identified propositions. The failure of commentators to appreciate the point and purpose of the position Ramsey actually advanced in “Universals” results from (a) failing to consider the range of different arguments advanced there, (b) looking at “Universals” in isolation from Ramsey’s other papers and (c) failing to consider Ramsey’s writings in the context of the views that Russell and Wittgenstein held during the early 1920s. Seen from this wider perspective Ramsey arguments in “Universals” take on an altogether different significance. They not only anticipate important contemporary developments⎯the resurgence of Humeanism and the doctrine that the existence of universals can only be established a posteriori⎯but also point beyond them. (shrink)

Within the field of causal inference, it is desirable to learn the structure of causal relationships holding between a system of variables from the correlations that these variables exhibit; a sub-problem of which is to certify whether or not a given causal hypothesis is compatible with the observed correlations. A particularly challenging setting for assessing causal compatibility is in the presence of partial information; i.e. when some of the variables are hidden/latent. This paper introduces the possible worlds framework as a (...) method for deciding causal compatibility in this difficult setting. We define a graphical object called a possible worlds diagram, which compactly depicts the set of all possible observations. From this construction, we demonstrate explicitly, using several examples, how to prove causal incompatibility. In fact, we use these constructions to prove causal incompatibility where no other techniques have been able to. Moreover, we prove that the possible worlds framework can be adapted to provide a complete solution to the possibilistic causal compatibility problem. Even more, we also discuss how to exploit graphical symmetries and cross-world consistency constraints in order to implement a hierarchy of necessary compatibility tests that we prove converges to sufficiency. (shrink)

In this review I take to task the related views of E.J. Lowe, John Heil and Peter Simons according to which relations don't exist because they're dispensable qua truth-makers. I argue that this view is methodologically unstable because we also have reason to believe that relations exist because our best mathematical and scientific theories say so, i.e. quantify over them.

Physicists use different theories to describe the world on different scales. In particular, they use the standard model of particle physics at very high energies, but move to various effective field theories, such as quantum electrodynamics, when modelling lower energy scattering processes. One way to explain this methodological fact is pragmatic in spirit. According to this view, physicists move to an effective field theory at lower energies in order to extract predictions and qualitative understanding which would be difficult or impossible (...) to extract directly from a more fundamental theory. By contrast, another way of accounting for the methodological data is metaphysical in spirit. On this view, the reason that physicists use different theories at different scales is that the world actually exhibits different nomic structure on different scales. These two positions have recently been thrown into sharp relief in a debate between Woodward (2016) and Batterman (2021), with Woodward taking the pragmatist line and Batterman the metaphysical line. One difficulty with the metaphysical answer is that its content is unclear: in what sense exactly could an effective field theory provide a better representation of the nomic structure of the world in its domain of applicability than our world’s fundamental theory? This talk attempts to provide an answer to this question by developing a simple metaphysical model. I start by assuming a set of possible worlds which are nomically possible according to some fundamental theory (I suggest that one is free to adopt either a Humean or Non-Humean view of these fundamental nomic necessities). I then introduce an equivalence relation between possible worlds: two worlds are scale-E equivalent if they assign the same values to physical quantities below energy scale E (up to some finite level of precision P). The key question now is whether this relation induces equivalence classes on the set of nomically possible worlds. I argue that in the case of current quantum field theories this does indeed occur, as evidenced by the possibility of “integrating out” high energy degrees of freedom in the renormalisation group framework. The formation of equivalence classes in the fundamental theory's possibility space indicates that some of its high energy features do not make a difference to its low energy dynamical behaviour. This suggests the following reading of the claim that an effective field theory provides a better representation of the nomic structure of the world in its domain of applicability: the solutions of the effective field theory stand in one-to-one correspondence with equivalence classes induced by the scale-E equivalence relation, whereas the fundamental theory overcounts the physical possibilities which are relevant at scale E. In this sense, the effective field theory provides a more natural representation of low energy physics than the fundamental theory. I conclude by explaining how this metaphysical model offers a reduction compatible understanding of multiple realisability, once again pointing to renormalisation group results in quantum field theory to support this. (shrink)

Haag’s theorem has been interpreted as establishing that quantum field theory cannot consistently represent interacting fields. Earman and Fraser have clarified how it is possible to give mathematically consistent calculations in scattering theory despite the theorem. However, their analysis does not fully address the worry raised by the result. In particular, I argue that their approach fails to be a complete explanation of why Haag’s theorem does not undermine claims about the empirical adequacy of particular quantum field theories. I (...) then show that such empirical adequacy claims are protected from Haag’s result by the techniques that are required to obtain theoretical predictions for realistic experimental observables. I conclude by showing how Haag’s theorem is illustrative of a general tension between the foundational significance of results that can be obtained in perturbation theory and non-perturbative characterizations of the content of quantum field theory. 1 Introduction2 Haag’s Theorem and the Interaction Picture3 Earman and Fraser on the Success of Scattering Theory4 Haag’s Theorem and Empirical Adequacy5 Conclusion. (shrink)

Haag's theorem has been interpreted as establishing that quantum field theory cannot consistently represent interacting fields. Earman and Fraser have clarified how it is possible to give mathematically consistent calculations in scattering theory despite the theorem. However, their analysis does not fully address the worry raised by the result. In particular, I argue that their approach fails to be a complete explanation of why Haag's theorem does not undermine claims about the empirical adequacy of particular quantum field theories. I (...) then show that such empirical adequacy claims are protected from Haag's result by the techniques that are required to obtain theoretical predictions for realistic experimental observables. I conclude by showing how Haag's theorem is illustrative of a general tension between the foundational significance of results that can be obtained in perturbation theory and non-perturbative characterizations of the content of quantum field theory. (shrink)

Frant︠s︡uzʹka revoli︠u︡t︠s︡ii︠a︡: prokhodz︠h︡enni︠a︡ cherez smertʹ -- Romantyzm i khytristʹ dobra: Mefistofel i︠a︡k kulʹturnyĭ heroĭ -- Narodz︠h︡enni︠a︡ totalʹnosti: slabkistʹ indyvida, syla kolektyvnykh til -- Klas i︠a︡k hrupa obranykh: marksyzm -- Rasa i︠a︡k "use": rasyzm i zakhid -- Hotui︠u︡chysʹ do katastrof: palinhenesii︠a︡ i kinet︠s︡ʹ stolitti︠a︡ -- Fashyzm: triumf transheokratiï -- Nat︠s︡yzm: rasa i︠a︡ zakon -- Komunizm: vid emansypat︠s︡iï do rabstva -- Rosiĭsʹka ideolohii︠a︡: sumishi ta ekstremy -- Zamistʹ vysnovkiv: plynnistʹ ideolohiĭ i XXI stolitti︠a︡.

vyp. 1. Obshchestvennyi︠a︡ nauki i teoreticheskai︠a︡ filosofīi︠a︡.

Tradit︠s︡ionnai︠a︡ ėpistemologii︠a︡ i eë problemy -- Ot tradit︠s︡ionnoĭ ėpistemologii k ėpistemologii snachala-znanii︠a︡ -- Kritika skeptit︠s︡izma i reli︠a︡tivizma -- Novye i gibridnye ėpistemologicheskie podkhody s tochki zrenii︠a︡ ėpistemologii snachala-znanii︠a︡ -- Ėpistemologicheskie problemy i kontekstualʹnyĭ realizm -- Gruppovai︠a︡ ėpistemologii︠a︡ -- Fenomenologii︠a︡, ėstetika i ėtika -- Perspektivnoe znanie -- Nauchnoe znanie v kontekste.

Автор ярким и доступным языком описывает жизнь Сократа и его философское мировоззрение, а также на основе источников путем логических рассуждений опровергает многие ошибочные представления об этом философе. Для историков и широкого круга читателей.

This paper examines confidentiality and its nature and analyses the guidelines laid down by the Hippocratic Oath as well as the British and World Medical Associations for maintaining such confidentiality between doctor and patient. There are exceptions to practically any code of rules and this is true also for confidentiality. Some of these exceptions make it appear that very little is confidential. The three values implicit in confidentiality would seem to be privacy, confidence and secrecy. Each of these values is (...) discussed and developed in this paper. In conclusion, the question is suggested that maybe in the face of death, doctor and patient need to re-examine the pre-suppositions of privacy, confidence and secrecy on which the confidential relationship is based. (shrink)

Brian Ellis has argued that the assigning of forces is, in the final analysis, a matter of convention. This conclusion is backed by the premises (1) that forces and force-effects are necessary and sufficient for each other, and (2) that the classification of some state of affairs as a force-effect is at least partly conventional. We argue that the first premise is false, that the second premise is ambiguous as between several senses of "conventional," and finally that he has not (...) established that force-effects are conventional in the sense required for the conclusion he wishes to draw. (shrink)